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Abstract 
Foreign policy of any nation serves as a mirror of its domestic reality.  It begins with identification and 
articulation of national interests. It is very important to assert that whatever this nation‟s interest 
represents, serves the principal consideration in the formulation and execution of national policies both at 
domestic and international levels. One of the cardinal points of Nigerian foreign policy is the maintenance of 
peace and security in Africa .This has enabled her to play an active role in peacemaking and peace keeping 
in the continent since independence. Nigeria has participated in many peacekeeping and related missions 
globally. In line with her foreign policy, Darfur is not an exception. Nigeria has not only been a key actor in 
political efforts to mediate in the Darfur Crisis, but in addition has provided a bulk of her troops to the 
African-Union-United Nations hybrid peace keeping mission in Darfur. 
 The conflict in Darfur constituted a threat to Nigeria‟s security largely because of Darfur i links to 
neighbouring states which are close to Nigeria. The possibility of the flow of refugees from the conflict area 
into Nigeria could be a problem. The implication on the security and welfare of Nigerians is an issue that 
cannot be ignored. The maintenance of peace and security, especially on the continent of Africa, is an 
abiding interest which Nigeria is committed towards. All the above justify Nigerian involvement in 
resolving the Darfur crisis. Depending on the precise terms of mandate a key role for peacekeepers is to 
patrol the grey area zone during the climax of the conflict. But so far the evidence suggests that Niger ian 
contingent have not been able to effectively handle this aspect. The absence of a national policy on 
peacekeeping has made it difficult to define the nation‟s participation with clear political and economic 
objectives and without an exit option. In view of the issues raised above, it has become necessary to review 
Nigerian peacekeeping efforts so far, in order to ascertain the benefits and loss. There is no doubt that the 
Nigerian contingents faced serious challenges in the form of finance, equipment, a nd mandate which all 
affected her operation in Darfur. This paper will therefore look into these challenges and the Nigerian 
contingent‟s achievement against the backdrop. It will draw the attention of the leadership to the lapse and 
suggest improvements for the future.  
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Introduction 
The foreign policy of any nation is a mirror image of its domestic reality. It begins with 
identification and communication of national interests. It is important to assert that 
whatever this nation‟s interests represent become the principal consideration in the 
formulation and execution of national policies both at the domestic and international 
levels .It is necessary to situate the general principles of Nigerian foreign policy and to 
highlight specific provision which enables it to play an active role in peacemaking and 
peace keeping in the continent since independence. 
At the height of the cold war, many Africans persistently called for an African solution to 
African problems. They blamed their inability to achieve their aim on the pernicious proxy 
wars of the cold war era that engulfed parts of the African continent. Between 1960 and 
1990, eighteen civil wars in Africa resulted in about 7 million deaths and spawned 5 
million refugees. Though the then superpower rivalry of the cold war fuelled many African 
conflicts, their roots were internal: inept political leadership that manipulated ethnicity to 
favour or suppress particular groups, unresolved differences from colonially inherited 
artificial borders, weak and unproductive economics, inefficient bureaucracies, unstable or 
weak institutions and fragile political authority (Zartman 1997). 
There is a new urgency among African policymakers in search of an effective mechanism 
for resolving African conflicts. As Francis Deng stated, “Africans…are recognizing that 
the world does not care much about them and that they must take their destinies into 
their own hands” (Kladiagala et al 2001). Coincidence of interests seems to have emerged 
and years of independence have led to the search to putting in the practice the concept of 
“Pax Africana” to overcome their inherent weakness. However,   African States also 
constructed their own continental and regional institutions. For Africans and most post 
colonial states, building alliances is a well tested strategy for weak states in search of 
peace and security. African states banded together into blocs that would enhance their 
leverage in world affairs. These institutions became vital in solving problems collectively 
and in the quest for economic integration. As the most important institution, the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established to give meaning to Africa‟s collective 
action in matters of development, liberation and conflict resolution. 
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These newer institutions could only be as strong or weak as the constituent parts that 
make them up. This led countries like Nigeria, because of their pivotal role in African 
affairs, to prod, cajole and in some cases to entice regional states to take things into their 
own hands, and to work in concert to manage conflict in Africa. Nigeria has been involved 
in numerous peacekeeping operations all over the trouble spots of the world. In line with 
her foreign policy, Darfur is no exception. 
The trust of this paper is divided into six. These are, Conceptual Clarification, Darfur 
Crisis, Nigerian and Darfur crisis, Challenges, Conclusion and Recommendation. 
Conceptual Clarification 
Peace Process 
The totality of human experience over the years has shown in practical terms that there 
can be no societal development and human security without peace. However peace is 
defined not just as the absence of war and commotion, but also the presence of justice. 
This explains why Martin Luther King Jr (1968:12) posited that peace has become a value 
humanity has come to desire greatly. Even if you focus on the France revolution, the 
Nigerian civil war, the war in Darfur (Sudan), the story is the same and the story is that 
war and violence “kill” peace, destroy human lives and property, retard the rate of 
development and divert development  resources to war execution (Alexander ,2007:2). 
Conflict resolution is a range of methods for alleviating sources of conflict. The term 
“Conflict resolution” is sometimes used interchangeably with the term dispute resolution 
or alternative dispute resolution (Bar, 2004:54). Process of conflict resolution includes 
negotiations, mediation and diplomacy. The process of arbitration, litigation and formal 
complaint process such as ombudsman processes are usually described with the term 
dispute resolution, although some refer to them as “conflict resolution”. The process of 
mediation and arbitration are often referred to as alternative dispute resolution. Peace 
process becomes vital in the process of achieving a sustainable peace in a troubled state. 
Peacekeeping 
In the view of Kirgis (cited in Fred Agwu 2007:23). “Peacekeeping consists essentially of 
observer missions and lightly armed forces monitoring ceasefires, operating in an 
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essentially static mode with the consent of the parties involved. It does not envisage 
involvement in an ongoing conflict and in some places can be adopted before any conflict 
breaks out”. 
Peacekeeping is thus, a peaceful third party intervention which operates with a set of 
guiding principles that include the consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality and 
the non-use of force except in self defence. The conception was adopted by the Brahimi 
report in its submission that the consent of the parties, impartiality and use of force only 
in self defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping (Ibid). 
The end of the cold war in 1945 brought a lot of radical change in the number of 
peacekeeping operations embarked upon by the United Nations. These significant 
increases in the number of peacekeeping operations were accompanied by a fundamental 
change in their single function associated with traditional operations. It has evolved into 
multiplicity of tasks at the same time, the composition of post cold war peacekeeping 
operations became more diverse and complex: peacekeepers were drawn from a wider 
variety of occupation (military, civilian, police and diplomatic), nations and cultures 
(Wibke et al 2004:3). In this instance, contemporary peacekeeping can now be 
appropriately characterized as multilateral, multidimensional, multinational and 
multicultural. 
Since becoming a member of the UN in 1960, Nigeria has consistently committed itself to 
the cause of peacekeeping and peacemaking. She sent her first troops to participate in the 
UN peace mission in the Congo, only days to independence. The key thing in global 
peacekeeping is the men and women who risk their lives in the interest of peace. Nigeria 
has more of these people than any other country in the world (The Guardian May 31 2009). 
It has been Nigeria‟s belief that socio economic development and integration in Africa can 
only be attained under an atmosphere of peace and stability. 
The implication of Nigeria‟s participation in peacekeeping in Africa is that African‟s 
problem is Nigeria‟s problem as some of these African countries have a common boundary 
with Nigeria. Take for example Ghanaians once immigrated to Nigeria during its crisis in 
1983 this tasked the purse of the Nigerian Federal government.   These external problems 
have significant implication on the stability of the country. Nigeria cannot ignore African 
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problems rather she must maintain the principle of Afrocentrism. This is so because; one 
out of every five Africans is a Nigerian. In the entire African continent, no national 
economy has the numerous potentials that the Nigeria economy has strategically, Nigeria 
has to be involved in crisis management in Africa (Abiola,A.L and Salihu H.A 1998:63-78). 
The situation in Darfur region of Sudan is a reminder of Nigeria‟s continued commitment 
to peace keeping in Africa. 
The Darfur Crisis 
The Darfur region is in the western part of Sudan. It is a geographically large area 
comprising approximately 250,000 square kilometres with an estimated population of 6 
million. Darfur borders with Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. Since 1994 
the region has been divided administratively into three states of North, South and West 
Darfur.  Like all other states in Sudan, each of the three states in Darfur is headed  by a 
Governor   (Wali), appointed by the central government in Khartoum and supported by a 
local administration. The economy of the three Darfur states is based mainly on 
subsistence and limited industrial farming, as well as cattle herding. 
The crisis in Darfur started in February 2003 when two rebel groups emerged to challenge 
the national Islamic Front (NIF) Government in Khartoum. The Sudan Liberation Army 
(SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) claim that the government of Sudan 
discriminates against Moslem African ethnic groups in Darfur and has systematically 
targeted those ethnic groups since the early 1990s. The Government of Sudan dismisses 
the SLA and JEM as terrorists‟. The conflict pits the three African ethnic groups, the Fur, 
Zaghasa and Massaleit, against nomadic Arab ethnic groups. The tension between the 
largely African Muslim ethnic groups and the Arab inhabitants of Darfur can be traced to 
the 1930s and most recented surfaced in the 1980s. Successive governments in Khartoum 
have long ignored the African ethnic groups in Darfur and have done very little to prevent 
or contain attacks by Arab militants against non-Arabs in Darfur. The roots of the conflict 
in Darfur are complex. In addition to the tribal feuds resulting from desertification and 
the quest for arable grazing land, the availability of modern weapons, issues relating to 
identity, governance, and the emergence of armed rebel movements which enjoy popular 
support amongst certain tribes, played a major role in shaping the crisis. 
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Non –Arab groups took up arms against successive central governments in Khartoum, 
albeit unsuccessfully. In the early 1990s the NIF government came to power adopted a 
policy of “induced social explosion” through the Janjaweed militias to destabilise and 
contain the uprising in Darfur. 
In mid 2003, the government of Sudan increased its presence in Darfur by arming Arab 
militias, the Janjaweed and by deploying the Popular Defence Force (PDF). The 
Janjaweed, under the direction of regular government forces reportedly unleashed a 
campaign of terror against civilians. The Arab militia engaged in what United Nations 
officials have described as ethnic cleansing of the African ethnic group of Darfur. “Men 
have been executed, women have been raped, and more than 2000000 people forced into 
exile in neighbouring countries”. In early February 2004, the government launched a 
major military offensive against the rebel forces and in mid-February 2004, President 
Omar Bashir, in a nationally televised speech, declared that the security forces had 
crushed the SLA and JEM and offered amnesty to the rebels. 
The forceful expulsion of the mainly African ethnic groups from their homes was done in a 
deliberate, sequenced and systematic way. There was a total disengagement of 
administration and suspension of all government services. These included the suspension 
of most government functions, including payment of salaries to government workers and 
the abandonment of basic government services, such as healthcare and law enforcement. 
According to the United Nations, once government officials leave these communities, the 
people are then accused of being rebel sympathizers and are targeted by government 
backed militias. The Janjaweed burn villages, loot the properties of non Arabs, abduct 
children, rape women, and prevent people from returning to their homes. 
Nigeria and the Darfur Crisis 
The first international involvement was led by the Chadian President who was concerned 
about the effects of conflict –induced displacement in Chad and who had some standing 
both with the Government of Sudan, who had helped him achieve power and Zaghawa 
leaders within the SLA, his own ethnic group. He mediated a 45 –day ceasefire between 
the GOS and SLM in the Chadian border town of Abeche in September 2003. It is of 
interest to note that the ceasefire disintegrated and Abeche meetings collapsed as 
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President Deby blamed the failures on the demands of the SLM and JEM. This assertion 
severely comprised his credibility as an “honest broker” as the SLM and JEM demanded 
international observer presence at any further talks. Chad was able to assist with the 
help of the African Union. A ceasefire agreement allowed humanitarian access in Darfur 
at the Chadian capital N‟djamena in April 2004 between the Government of Sudan and a 
joint SLM and JEM delegation, as GOS had objected to US, EU and UN participation and 
eventually compromised on the AU as mediators with international observation talks on 
humanitarian issues. For the AU, the Darfur crisis was the first test of its constitutive act 
and its conflict resolution provisions. It took over the mediation started by the Chadian 
government in April 2004. After the signing of the HCFA, the Assembly of Heads of state 
and Governments of the African Union (AU) in May 2004 backed the deployment of the 
African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur to monitor the agreement and bring under 
control the humanitarian crisis.    
 
The result of the agreement on the 28th of May 2004 led to the dispatch of the Armed 
Protection Force of about three hundred troops from Rwanda and Nigeria to the western 
Sudanese region of Darfur.  In May and June 2004, it held peace talks in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia and from August the peace talks continued in Abuja, Nigeria. 
The AU summit in Addis Ababa, on July 7, 2004 focused on the Darfur crises. When the 
issue of Darfur was raised before the AU„s peace and security council, it mandated its 
chair person to prepare a plan for making AMIS more effective. Other issues considered 
were the need to disarm and neutralise the Janjaweed militias, protect civilians and 
facilitate humanitarian assistance. More importantly Obasanjo acting in his capacity as 
African Union Chairperson, appointed former Nigerian Head of State General Abdul-
salam Abubakar as his special envoy to Chad and Sudan on the Darfur conflict. The 
Special envoy visited Darfur for assessment of the humanitarian crisis and the report of 
the visit was a major catalyst that spurred the AU to intensify efforts for peaceful 
negotiation (Adeniji, 2004:10).  This gesture encouraged dialogue between rebel groups 
and the central government in Abuja in August 2004 for peace talks. This led to the 
signing of Abuja Peace agreement and consequently led to Darfur Peace agreement. This 
showed that Nigeria devoted enormous time, human and material resources to the 
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Sudanese peace process. With this development, one can posit that, Nigeria stays 
committed to the peace process through thick and thin more than any other state in the 
continent.  
Nigerian’s interest in Darfur 
Nigeria was not only a key  actor in the political efforts  to mediate  the crisis but also 
provided the bulk of troops as well as the former military head of the African Union-
United Nations hybrid  peacekeeping force in Darfur. However, the robust nature of 
Nigeria‟s involvement in the mediation requires the identification of Nigeria‟s national 
interests with respect to the conflict, especially in view of the fact that Nigerian service 
men are ready to lay down their lives in the quest for peace in continent. This paper 
identifies one primary national interest and a number of secondary interests with respect 
to the Darfur conflict. 
Primary National Interest 
A country„s primary national interest involves state survival and security, as well as the 
pursuit of wealth, economic growth and power. The conflict in Darfur was seen as a threat 
to Nigeria‟s security largely because of its potential to spill over into neighbouring states 
to Sudan and ultimately into Nigeria. It was said that the government of Chad accuses 
the janjaweed militia of crossing the border and attacking villagers and refugees from 
Darfur in eastern Chad. There were reports of the invasion of the Chadian capital of 
Ndjamena by anti government rebels whose intention was to topple the administration of 
Idris Deby. The Government of Sudan also accused Chad of providing support for Darfur‟s 
National Redemption front rebels and even fixing them into the Chadian army. 
In a similar vein the Central African Republic accused Sudan of backing rebels of the 
Union of Democratic Forces for unity who launch incursions from Darfur and have seized 
towns in Chad. These development points to the possibility of a spread of the conflict, if it 
is left unresolved, to the north eastern reaches of Nigeria and a possible destabilation of 
the region between western Sudan (Darfur) and north –eastern Nigeria. The spread of 
conflict across international borders could cause a complex security situation of the 
respective states are interlinked. 
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The second major area of concern with respect to Nigeria‟s primary national interest 
arises from the possibility of the flow of refugees away from the immediate conflict and 
eventually into Nigeria, and the impact that will have on the security and welfare of 
Nigerians. It is estimated that the conflict has led to the displacement of approximately 2 
million Darfurians, with over 200,000 having sought refuge in chad.With the attacks by 
Sudanese government forces on Darfurians it is anticipated that the flow of refugees will 
continue to rise. However, with Nigeria having the most buoyant economy in the 
continent, it is doubtless the country will eventually become a preferred destination for 
the Darfur refugees. There are currently Chadian refugees who fled from fighting in 
Ndjamena, in north-eastern Nigeria. 
Secondary Interests 
The maintenance of peace and security especially on the continent of Africa, is an abiding 
interest which Nigeria is signatory such as the United nations charter, the constitutive 
act of the African Union and the ECOWAS treaty .this has provided the normative and 
legal basis for Nigeria‟s leadership of, and contribution towards, several peacekeeping 
missions at the continental and global levels. The establishment of peace and security 
provide the necessary foundations for democracy political stability and development which 
are global values towards which Nigeria is similarly committed. This makes it imperative 
for Nigerian to be involved in resolving the Darfur crisis.Relatedly , Nigeria‟s quest for a 
permanent seat on the United Nation‟s Security Council is premised upon her 
contributions towards peacekeeping and conflict resolution in a war ridden continent. She 
has served as a non permanent member of the Security Council. This makes Nigeria‟s 
contribution towards global peace and security through her involvement in the resolution 
of crises such as that of Darfur an obligation. This will definitely enhance her credentials 
and improved her future chances of attaining the much coveted permanent UNSC seat. 
The contribution of Nigeria towards lasting sustainable peace in Darfur Sudan cannot be 
overemphasized. Nigeria was among the largest troop contingent support to the then 
African Union mission in Sudan –AMIS (HRW, 2006:52). However, Nigeria‟s contribution 
to the crisis in Darfur Region is significant and reasonable, the facts and data on ground 
reveals that more should have been done. This problem was attributed to the worst 
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humanitarian disaster and non implementation of peace agreement by Omar Al-Bashir‟s 
government was a problem. 
Challenges Faced by Nigerian Contingent in Darfur 
At the deployment of Nigerian‟s contingent she faced a remarkably complex operational 
and political environment as illustrated below: 
The Absence of a Peace Support Operations Policy 
Nigerian sends contingents without properly articulated and focused goals. This is due to 
the absence of a vibrant national peace support operation policy. This has resulted to 
losing resources and personnel, restoring peace, and withdrawing for other nations to 
enjoy the fruit of their labour. In addition there is no synergy between relevant ministries 
and agencies for carefully planned peace keeping operations to achieve set objectives. The 
absence of such a policy, strategic planning became a serious and recurrent   problem. 
Nigeria contingent encountered a lot of problem in the area of planning for PSO due to the 
absence of this policy. 
 Budgetary and Administrative Constraints 
Peace keeping operations by their nature are costly affairs. The most important factor on 
the future of peace keeping in Nigeria is financing.  UN standard of operation requires 
contingents from troop contributing countries to be self sufficient for 60 days, and may 
require or agree to fund, nationally held in theatre stocks of 30 days. As a result, 
contingents are expected to deploy with 90 days of stock. 
According to Galadima, this does not take into account re-supply pipeline time and if for 
instance, there is a 14 day ordering, processing and pipeline time corded ship time) from 
member nation‟s depots it would be prudent for contingents to deploy with additional 
stocks to cover the time lag.   The AU experience with its military observer missions have 
proved to be expensive and could not be financed from the AU peace fund.  It had to rely 
on donor funding to finance its peace missions. It is donor funded and as mentioned 
earlier on, the EU and USA have contributed to the bulk of the mission‟s budget.  This 
creates a serious problem in the sense that AU dependency on external funding will not 
guarantee its freedom and independence on decisions relating to strategic operation and 
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even tactical aspects of peace operations it may wish to undertake. The reason for the AU 
depending on donor sponsorship is that the African Union has no effective mechanism for 
obtaining financial contribution from its members; this has affected the African Union on 
embarking on complex peace operations on their own. 
 
 The management structure within the AU and those of its field operations have shielded 
away from delegation and adopted a micro management approach. This is not helpful 
when it comes to matters that involve peacekeeping operations.  The effect of this has 
resulted to poor planning which has produced ineffective timetables for deployment.  The 
aftermath of this has led to occasional clashes between its civilian and military mindsets 
of the organisation.  Because conditions of deployment were not put into consideration 
alongside with the necessary numbers needed in field operations, peacekeepers were not 
able to understand their duties in the field.  Parties in the conflict have taken advantage 
of this weakness. 
MANDATE 
The issue of clear mandate is another knotty problem, which we are often faced with, 
particularly in UN operations. The nature and scope of the mandate of a peace support 
operation to a large extent is a key determinant of its success or failure. The 
consequential mismatch between response options and the rules of engagement often 
leaves the troop in a quandary resulting in inaction. The mandate in Darfur generated 
criticism regarding the N‟djamena agreement which was seen as insufficient and did not 
make adequate provision for the protection of civilians and said it was the duty of the 
Sudanese government to offer security for the population.  It lacked the coercive power to 
deal with violent militias who were committing crimes against humanity and genocide.  
Some had rightly observed that AMIS „protection by presence‟ strategy had not been 
effective so far, as protection of vulnerable civilians cannot be guarantee in an event of an 
escalation of security threat”(ICG 2005).  One representative from the non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) community noted that „there is a lot of confusion among Sudanese 
civilians and humanitarian aid organisations about the exact role the of the African Union 
mission”().  
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Disappointment with the AU‟s mandate and performance on the part of both the 
protection force within AMIS and civilians with regards to violence in the camp has been 
expressed.  One of the Darfur Integrated Task force told Human Rights Watch that “we 
don‟t react, we don‟t go proactively” (Human Rights Watch 2005).  AMIS personnel 
informed one independent assessment team that they want to protect civilians but under 
the current mandate the task is not practicable” (Ray Suarez 2005). One commander also 
told Human Rights Watch. ”I need a stronger mandate, like a peace enforcement 
mandate” (Human Rights Watch 2005). An example of this was the situation in Darfur 
Where Nigerian troops were compelled to work within a framework that is highly 
inadequate.  
 
Contingent Owned Equipment 
COE are standard and specialized equipment prescribed by the UN for deploying 
contingents to take along to a mission area. Normally the UN reimburses contingents for 
the cost of such equipment and pays an agreed amount for their use. At the end of the 
mission, the equipment remains the property of the contributing country. In a situation 
when the equipment does not meet the standard prescribed in the MOU with the UN, the 
organization will not pay. We lost a lot in this area due to lack of strategic planning and 
budgetary constraint. A case in point was the initial deployment of our troops to Darfur in 
2004, where the Nigerian contingent was deployed without the full complement of their 
requirement. Nigeria lost out in this area which would have been mouth-watering gains. 
This denied her to earn reasonable income for her involvement in Darfur. Russia has M18 
helicopters serving UN PSOs which pockets $6m annually. Cote d‟ivoire makes as much 
as $5m annually for its helicopters in the services of the UN. Ghana and South Africa 
make good income from the three helicopters they own. We do not have a warship on paid 
services at the disposal of the UN, whereas Bangladeshi warship generating money for 
the country in Sudan. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Nigerian involvement in peace keeping in Darfur has been reviewed as clearly stated in 
this paper and the fact speaks for itself.  There is no doubt that Nigeria peace keeping 
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operation was a bold initiative.  However, the challenges have been identified and must be 
addressed to ensure effectiveness in her peacekeeping operations.  The UN needs to assist 
Nigeria in becoming more effective in its peace keeping operations in Africa. 
 
We hope that Nigeria would profit from her performance in Darfur for better results in 
the coming years. Nigeria should take into consideration her domestic situation, her 
national interests and the dynamics of geopolitics in her subsequent efforts at 
peacekeeping. This will no doubt make her to be in tune with public opinion within the 
country and not to offend sensibilities on the international scene.  
 
Recommendation 
 If our armed forces are to participate in peacekeeping operations in the future, the 
mandate should be clear spelt out and achievable objectives, the mandate should be 
precise and finite; and there must be a reasonable arrangement for the safety and 
security of the Nigerian personnel. 
 Our Afro-centric policy must be based on cogent and coherent strategic objectives. 
Africa is the second largest continent in the world and the one with the highest 
diversity of states but Nigeria has not been utilizing its manifest destiny to lead the 
continent effectively and to use such leadership to achieve her national interests 
and continental aspirations. As far as the Armed Forces are concerned, Nigeria 
should concentrate efforts on two roles ;regional security such as the Gulf of Guinea 
Guard force, the emerging sub regional standby forces and the upcoming Africa 
standby force (ASF) and secondly UN operation because Nigerian personnel have 
invaluable experience in peacekeeping operation. 
 There is need for a total review of the nation‟s defence doctrine to take these into 
consideration .There is a readiness by policy makers to recognise that the world has 
changed, but is not to adapt institutions to new situation. 
 As regarding peace keeping operation government should review the role of each 
institution plays and the relationships between the institution. In this regard, 
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government should create a national coordinating body to bring together relevant 
ministries and agencies for strategic planning as well as evaluation of peacekeeping 
missions with clearly spelt out goals to be achieved for each mission. Government 
should also work within the UN system to support the use of appropriately skilled 
civilian for peacekeeping missions. 
 Government should also set up a coordinating body for Nigerian peacekeeping 
efforts within mission countries. The national coordinating body should help to 
consolidate some Nigerian enterprises in key sectors to make them able to meet 
international standards in terms of quality of staff, expertise and services so that 
they would be engaged in reconstruction works, be involved in genuine investments 
and participation in those countries economics and also government should 
consider strategic relationships with those countries to extract some specific 
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